Articles I Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality of "value rationality" and "instrumental rationality." Both of these rationalities are expressions of goal-directed behavior, but their conceptions of costs widely diverge. Instrumental rationality entails a strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals, necessitating the abandonment or adjustment of goals if the costs of realizing them are too high. Value-rational behavior is produced by a conscious "ethical, aesthetic, religious or other" belief, "independently of its prospects of success."6 Behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices. Some spheres or goals of life are considered so valuable that they would not normally be up for sale or compromise, however costly the pursuit of their realization might be. The means to achieving these objectives might change, but the objectives themselves would not.
The term value-rational does not, of course, mean that the values expressed by such behavior are necessarily laudable. Indeed, the values in question may range from pure pride or prejudice (vis-a-vis some groups or belief systems) to goals such as dignity, self-respect, and commitment to a group or a set of ideals. Likewise, value-rational acts can range from long-run sacrifices for distant goals to violent expressions of prejudice or status.
Most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations. For it to be instrumentally used by leaders, ethnicity must exist as a valued good for some. However, ethnic mobilization cannot proceed on value-rational grounds alone. Strategies are necessary; coalitions must be formed; the response of the adversary-the state, the opposed ethnic group, the in-group dissenters-must be anticipated. And many would join such mobilization, when it has acquired some momentum and chance of success, for entirely selfish reasons. The origins of ethnic mobilization are thus value-rational, and its evolution may contain a lot of strategic behavior.
To illustrate this argument in ample detail and for tractability, I shall restrict my analytical focus to only one kind of nationalist or ethnic behavior. A useful distinction is often made between the nationalism of exclusion and the nationalism of resistance.7 The idea, of course, is quite old. The nationalism of anticolonial movements was never comparable to the nationalism of Hitler.
In the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a society-domestic or foreign-seeks to impose its own values on the various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, sometimes violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of power. Typically, this takes the form of enforcing language, religion, or culture via control of the state, or excluding groups from power on the basis of ethnic characteristics only. In the nationalism of resistance, a dominated group opposes such a move and seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony and power of the dominant group.
I will argue that dignity and self-respect form the microfoundations of the latter kind of nationalism or ethnic behavior. Driven by such values, resisting nationalists are willing to endure very high costs-and for long periods of time. The cost-benefit calculus in such behavior does not work in a way that can be easily aligned with a standard account of instrumental rationality. Indeed, long time frames, a radical uncertainty of results, and the serious possibility of high costs that usually accompany the nationalism of resistance make such an alignment extremely difficult.
As scholarly work proceeds further, the concept of value rationality will need greater unpacking. I take the first steps here by concentrating on only one kind of nationalism: the nationalism of resistance. I am certain that dignity and self-respect cannot be the microfoundations of all forms of ethnic or nationalist behavior. Pending later work, for example, it is reasonable to suppose that the nationalism of exclusion is driven substantially by hatred and/or deep-rooted condescension: Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, the anti-Semitism of Hitler, and Hindu nationalism in India would be some examples. In what follows, the claim of dignity and self-respect applies only to the nationalism of resistance, not to the nationalism of exclusion.8
Terms and Distinctions
Let me start with definitions of the principal terms used here: ethnicity, nation, and rationality. Not having the same meaning for everyone, these terms need clarification.
Ethnicity is used in two different ways. In the narrower, popularly understood sense, ethnic groups are racial or linguistic groups. There is, however, a broader meaning as well. As Donald Horowitz suggests,9 all conflicts based on ascriptive (birth-based) group identities, real or imagined-race, language, religion, tribe, or caste-can be called ethnic. In this larger usage, ethnic conflicts can range from (1) the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland and the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India to (2) the blackwhite conflict in the United States and South Africa and the Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia, (3) the Quebecois problem in Canada and the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka, and (4) ShiaSunni troubles in Pakistan. In the narrower view, the first of these examples are religious, the second racial, the third linguistic, and the fourth sectarian. The term ethnic has customarily been used in the past for the second and third types of conflicts, not for the first and fourth.
Proponents of the broader usage do not find the narrower distinctions analytically helpful. They argue that the form these conflicts take-religious, racial, linguistic, tribal-does not change their intensity or relative intractability. The broader meaning of ethnic is now increasingly prevalent in the social sciences; I will use the term in this way.
Also, for the purposes of this paper, the terms ethnicity and nation can be used interchangeably. If the discussion were about why some ethnic conflicts remain bounded within the existing state boundaries while others gravitate toward independence, a distinction between the two terms would be essential. Ethnic groups, as we know, can live without a state of their own, making do with some cultural rights (e.g., use of mother tongue in schools) or affirmative action; but a nation means bringing ethnicity and statehood together.'0 This distinction, however, is not necessary for our purposes here, because the discussion is about a whole class of conflicts, which are framed in terms of national identity or ethnicity.
What about our third key term, rationality? In its standard economic usage, the term refers to instrumental rationality, and it has two meanings. First, it means consistency of choice: if I prefer A over B and B over C, then I must prefer A over C. The second meaning is identical with self-interest. Action is rational if it is aimed at realizing self-interest. If costs of an action outweigh benefits, self-interest will not be served; hence a cost-benefit calculus accompanies analysis based on self-interest.
In philosophical discussions, rationality refers to "reasoned assessment as the basis of action."'1 Such an assessment can be based on self-interest but also on larger values. Self can be broadly defined in terms of group goals, national identity, religious values, aesthetic considerations, and so on. This larger view would also include what Weber called "value rationality." In Economy and Society, Weber categorized social action into four types: instrumental-rational, value-rational, norm-oriented (based on conventions and traditions, without critical deliberation), and affective or impulsive (the expression of anger, envy, love, et cetera).
The alternatives to instrumentally rational behavior are thus not simply emotional or irrational behavior.12 Of the four Weberian categories of human action, the first two are goaldirected, only one of which is instrumental-rational, whose unique feature is a strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals and means. Such calculus may lead not only to a change of means for the realization of goals, but also to an alteration of goals if the costs of attaining them are prohibitive. Value-rationality is distinguished by a continual pursuit of goals, even if the costs of realizing them are high; it shows a high degree of commitment.
Which of these categories of behavior is represented by the term rational choice often used in economics and political science? Almost without exception, it is instrumental rationality with which rational-choice theorists identify. They either do not speak of goals, concentrating instead on the means; or they assume that self-interest is the goal of human action. I will, therefore, use these two terms-instrumental rationality and rational choiceinterchangeably in this paper. But I will not equate rationality with rational choice.
These distinctions have some important implications for a discussion of rationality. In a standard rational-choice account, there is considerable resistance to the idea that different motivations can underlie behavior in different spheres of life: that it may be perfectly rational for human beings to be instrumentally rational while buying a car, but value-rational while responding to questions of national liberation, school choice for children, affirmative action, or multiculturalism in universities.13 Moreover, rational choice also remains highly skeptical of the notion that individual action can be rooted in group interests, not selfinterest. Value-rational behavior would not find identification with group interests irrational.
What else can we say about value-rationality? According to Weber, as already noted, value-rational behavior is pursued "independently of its prospects of success."14 That notion, in my view, is best seen as an ideal type, or a pure case of value-rationality. Any reasonable notion of value-rational behavior cannot be insensitive to costs. A more realistic reformulation of Weber's notion is required. In order to provide that, let me use the simple economic concept of elasticity.
From development microeconomics, we know that demand for food is relatively, not absolutely, insensitive to price-people must eat, however expensive food might become-whereas demand for TV sets and cars is remarkably sensitive to price, suggesting thereby low price elasticity of demand for the former and high elasticity for the latter. We can similarly argue that valuerational behavior is relatively inelastic with respect to costs. A fully inelastic behavior as in the Weberian ideal type-with valuerational behavior on the horizontal axis and cost/price on the vertical-would be represented by a flat line, but low-elasticity behavior would slope downward, like demand curves, although the slope would not be as steep, as in the case of highly elastic goods such as cars. In this economic analogy, value-rational behavior is more like the demand for food, and instrumentalrational behavior like the demand for cars and TV sets.15
There is no doubt that an instrumentally rational-or rational choice-understanding of human behavior has made remarkable progress over the years, extending into newer directions and fields. Behavior covered by such reasoning and models ranges from economic decision making of consumers and firms to nuclear politics, legislative and bureaucratic behavior, and political mobilization and ethics. Indeed, the list of topics to which rational-choice models have been applied continues to grow.16 In principle, one cannot object to pushing a mode of analysis to fields where it was not applied before. Indeed, several new insights in the world of knowledge are generated precisely this way. Much has been learned on political mobilization by exploring the idea that the self-interest of individuals and the interest of the group to which they belong are two different things: class conflict may therefore be more latent than overt.17 The prisoner's dilemma game has taught us better than many other models that rationally behaving individuals may generate a macro outcome that is suboptimal for all. Similarly, how self-seeking political and bureaucratic behavior, as opposed to the selfish behavior of economic agents in competitive markets, can lead to a wasteful use of society's economic resources and hamper economic growth is a problem where rational choice has been especially useful as an explanatory tool.18
The issue therefore is not whether rational-choice theories explain human behavior at all. More germane is the question of whether rational-choice theories are especially relevant to a specific class of problems and a particular realm of human behavior, and if so, in what ways that realm might be different from others.19 In this realm-specific spirit,20 I ask whether and how far rational-choice theories can account for ethnic behavior and conflict, dominated as they often are by mass politics, not by the institutionalized forms of bureaucratic or legislative politics.21
The Big Gap: Where Do Ethnic Preferences Come From?
Before ethnic conflict can be explained, a rational-choice analyst is confronted with a twofold task: providing microfoundations of ethnic behavior and explaining ethnic mobilization. To begin with, one has to account for why individuals have, or develop, ethnic preferences. Can such preferences be explained instrumentallyi.e., as a means to a self-interested end (political power, www.apsanet.org 87 economic benefit, survival)? And since it would be instrumentally rational, given self-interest, for individuals to free ride, explaining ethnic mobilization requires specifying conditions under which it would not make sense for individuals to free ride and, in fact, it would be rational to join an ethnic movement or mobilization.
The standard rational-choice accounts assume that ethnicity can be seen instrumentally. They focus primarily on how leaders strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of power.22 This argument has an intuitive appeal because the behavior of many, if not all, political leaders can be cited in support.
If presented in this form, the instrumental-rational argument about ethnicity runs into a serious difficulty. The elite may indeed gain power by mobilizing ethnic identity without believing in it themselves, and could therefore behave instrumentally. But if the masses were only instrumental about ethnic identity, why would ethnicity be the basis for mobilization at all? Why do the leaders decide to mobilize ethnic passions in the first place? Why do they think that ethnicity, not the economic interests of the people, is the route to power? And if economic interests coincide with ethnicity, why choose ethnicity as opposed to economic interests for mobilization?
In principle, a rational-choice resolution of these problems exists. Ethnicity can serve as a focal point, facilitating convergence of individual expectations, and hence can be useful as a mobilization strategy. The idea of focal points comes from Thomas Schelling's seminal treatment of the coordination problem in bargaining. In the famous Schelling example:
When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understanding on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will find each other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet, so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is obvious to both of them.23
Schelling goes on to propose that without having an intrinsic value for the couple, the lost-and-found section of the department store could be one such place. It will, however, not be a focal point if there are too many lost-and-found sections in the store. A focal point is distinguished by its prominence or uniqueness: it has the instrumental power of facilitating the formation of mutually consistent expectations. Schelling then generalizes the principle: Spontaneous revolt may reflect similar principles: when leaders can easily be destroyed, people may require some signal for their coordination, [which is] ... so potent in its suggestions for action that everyone can be sure that everyone else reads the same signal with enough confidence to act on it, thus providing one another with immunity that goes with action in large numbers.24 Ethnicity, in other words, can be viewed as one such focal point for mobilization; it is not valued for its own sake. Its mobilizational potential may be deployed by leaders to extract goods and services from the modern sector, or to establish their own power.
The idea of a focal point is not sufficient to explain ethnic mobilization, for it does not distinguish between different kinds of collective action and what their respective costs might be. Robben Island was without question the harshest, most iron-fisted outpost in the South African penal system.... The warders were white and overwhelmingly Afrikaans-speaking, and they demanded a master-servant relationship. They ordered us to call them "baas," which we refused. The racial divide on Robben Island was absolute: there were no black warders and no white prisoners.... J]ourneying to Robben Island was like going to another country. Its isolation made it not simply another prison, but a world of its own, far removed from the one we had come from. The high spirits with which we left Pretoria had been snuffed out by its stern atmosphere; we were face to face with the realization that our life would be unredeemably grim. In Pretoria, we felt connected to our supporters and our families; on the island, we felt cut off and indeed we were. We had the consolation of being with each other, but that was the only consolation. My dismay was quickly replaced by a sense that a new and different fight had begun.30
After 27 years on Robben Island, Mandela did walk to triumph and freedom; but in 1962, when he was jailed, there was a good chance he would end up dying there. It was a life sentence after all, and he knew it beforehand. The same was true of his many fellow prisoners, if not to the same degree.
These examples illustrate a simple point, widely understood by activists in such struggles. Ex ante possibility of violence or coercion almost always accompanies ethnic or national resistance. Mobilization for ethnic or national protest cannot thus be equated with solving problems of economic or social coordination through the ethnic bond. It is a special kind of collective action, for the costs of resistance or mobilization are often known to be high.
Although exact estimates are hard to produce, it is generally agreed that in this century, many more people have died for a nation or an ethnic group-presumed or actual-than for joining a supranational economic collectivity, such as the European Economic Community, In the most ambitious, sophisticated, and erudite rationalchoice work on ethnic conflict so far, Russell Hardin takes up the challenge.35 He seeks to provide such microfoundations and also use them to explain ethnic mobilization and conflict. His proposal is threefold. First, "self-interest can often be matched with group interest" instrumentally. Identification with the group may be beneficial for two reasons: because "those who identify strongly with the group may gain access to positions under the control of the group" and because "the group provides a relatively secure and comfortable environment." The identity between individual and group interests, he argues, can only be "contingent," not "inherent," but it is enough to touch off ethnic mobilization. Second, explanation of ethnic mobilization can't be reduced to the problem of collective action where it is rational to free ride, or to a prisoners' dilemma where it is rational to defect. In ethnic mobilization, "[t]he central strategic problem is merely one of coordination." So as long as others in the group are cooperating, it is rational for me to cooperate-for if all cooperate, the likelihood of the group gaining power (or group objectives) goes up tremendously. "[P]ower based in coordination is superadditive, it adds up to more than the sum of individual contributions to it." Third, all one needs to keep the coordination game going is a "charismatic leader," a "focus," and a mechanism through which information about others cooperating is provided. "Coordination power is ... a function of reinforcing expectations about the behavior of others."36
Hardin's proposal entails serious difficulties. First, even if I believe in group goals, contingently or inherently, it is not clear why it is rational for me to cooperate when others cooperate with one another. For if they are cooperating, and if "coordination power" is "superadditive," then my group is very likely to come to power anyway and it is rational for me to take a free rideunless, of course, someone is monitoring my actions and the nonparticipants will be excluded from the rewards of the group's victory. Alternatively, my conscience could act as a monitor, giving me a sense of guilt or shame for not participating in group action even though I believe that the group's interests are my interests. Without these monitoring mechanisms, the situation does not have a unique optimum, but two optima: both free riding and participating could be rational. In a purely logical sense, Hardin's proposal thus requires monitoring of individual actions:
internally or by others. The former entails an individual who is more intrinsic than instrumental with respect to ethnicity (her conscience is her problem); and the latter is easy in small groups but monumentally difficult in large groups, even when an institutionalized regulation of individual behavior is devised. If the group action concerns my caste or tribe in a village or even a town, I may rationally coordinate: everyone knows me and I can be monitored. But if the group action is about an imagined ethnic or national community-involving many villages, towns, and states-I can escape detection if I cheat. Lacking the intimacy of small groups, how does one monitor an ethnic group or a nationality? The Hardin proposal thus cannot be size independent. A nation is not an intimately knowable, face-to-face community. It is a large, imagined community.
Second, why should ethnic or national mobilization be conceptualized as a coordination game, whereas other kinds of mobilization-such as peasant37 or working-class mobilization38-are more typical cases of collective action, crippled by free-rider problems? Must the group in question have some specific qualities that create "coordination" as the "central strategic problem," preempting endemic free riding? Can we account for this difference in a rational-choice framework, or is some other theory required to establish the difference? If the latter question is chosen to explore why ethnic action is different from other group actions, then it is potentially damaging for rational-choice theories, for it may show that some kinds of preferences emerge in a nonrational framework.
Hardin has one such proposal about ethnicity: that it may provide "epistemological comforts of home" or, put alternatively, security of environment. This solution only re-states the problem. Why does "ethnicity" provide a home? Why can't a trade union or a political party? The Communist experiment was, inter alia, premised upon the belief that the party would supplant the false consciousness of ethnicity and nation. After decades of trying, that experiment failed, and ethnicity has re-emerged-frighteningly so in several places. Once we believe that ethnicity can provide a home better than other groups can, we also accept that in a basic sense, the microfoundations of ethnicity are psychological, not rational.39
Thus, whether or not I think that my interests and my group's interests are different, the fundamental puzzle for instrumental rationality remains as follows: why should I, behaving in a purely instrumental-rational way, participate in group action before it is reasonably clear to me that the group is likely to win? Consider the structure of the problem diagrammatically (see Figure 1) . At time T1, when my group is not in power, my personal welfare is at a low level (W1); I expect that at time T2, when my group is in power, my welfare will rise to W2. The problem simply is that at time T1, I don't know ex ante how far away T2 is, and I also don't know how big the costs in the meantime will be. Depending on what the adversaries do, the sacrifice required could be low (looking like S1) or high (S2). It is not rational for me to join at time T1; I should let others join and when the movement or mobilization is already substantial and very likely close to T2, it will be rational for me to participate.40
To sum up, the microfoundations of the origins of ethnic mobilization are different from those that obtain once mobilization ------------s------ . . elf suffice as a each individual engaged in such creation was also acting in rela-I th role os a tion to an inherited set of practices. In order for an individual to , is the role of de , culturoe create, affirm, deny, or innovate a set of cultural practices-and a ny does culture good deal of that happens in everyday life-there has to be a prence we answer tationalism of existing set of normative practices in the framework of which the nationalism of , aton creation, affirmation, denial, or innovation acquires meaning. A )w that nonin-' ' ' w that ntonin-sentence or word has no meaning until a language exists. Cultural i the nationaltelfre n choices are thus different from buying a car or a house on the one elf-respect and hand and forming political strategies to defeat adversaries for political office on the other. Rational-choice theories may be more applicable to marginal decisions, less to decisions about , is a concept how people choose fundamental values.44 self-interest is Another clarification is necessary. Placing emphasis on a precase, a serious existing or inherited culture to explain ethnic behavior is sometimes seen as an endorsement of the "primordial" view of or intermedi-ethnicity. According to this view, ethnicity is an ascriptive given, nds or values? existing for centuries and therefore stronger than modern or as its ultimate rational forms of human motivation or institutional designs. bes, loneliness, Man, argues a leading exponent of the primordial view, is an ulatory frame-ethnic being, or a "national, not a rational animal. We need, therefore, to ask a historical question: when did human beings begin to question the idea of an ascriptive group hierarchy? In a work that has attracted wide attention, Charles Taylor has made two compelling arguments.57 First, in premodern times, one's identity-as in, Who am I, and where am I coming from?-was given or fixed by one's place in the hierarchical social structure. It was not negotiated. The rise of modernity has led to an increasing decay of traditional social hierarchies-ideationally and/or structurally. As a result, for the first time in history a new individual motivation has arisen: a selfawareness of dignity. One does not take one's "station" as inevitable. Second, the pursuit of dignity and self-respect is not monological, but dialogical. The "dialogue" takes place in a social context. Hermits may define dignity monologically, but the more general pursuits of dignity require recognition from society. This is especially so because society is not a random collection of individuals; rather, it comes with a historical inheritance of perceptions and misperceptions. Our identity as modern human beings is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or groups of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining, demeaning, or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.58 Thus, even if structural group hierarchy is absent, a discursive hierarchy, laced with "confining, demeaning, or contemptible" pictures for some groups, may well exist. Crude illiberal prejudice or hatred is, of course, an obvious source for such views. But the problem is much more complex. It is worth recalling that until this century, even well-meaning liberals believed in group-based notions of civility and barbarism. In one of the founding texts of liberalism, John Stuart Mill argued: Nobody can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of the French Navarre, to be brought into the current of ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people-to be a member of the French nationality ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the halfsavage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander, as members of the British nation.59
In the modern world, thus, two different notions of dignity and worth have often been at odds: one stemming from the culturally inherited conceptions of groups as better or worse, and another arising out of a decline of social hierarchies and the rise of equality. The latter seeks to undermine the former by challenging the inherited structure or discourse of group hierarchy.
The question of microfoundations-where ethnic or national preferences come from in the nationalism of resistance-can now be more precisely phrased. What are the implications of a historically and culturally structured notion of ascriptive hierarchy for the individual-group interaction in modern times? How does an individual feel group relations?
An individual may end up defining a core of her identity in terms of her group because she is defined as such by society, a definition over whose origins she has no control but one whose reordering will not take place unless efforts are made to compel society to change its recognition. The question is not simply one of waiting for others to launch the effort and taking a free ride. The individual would like to participate in the effort because she can't live a "reduced mode of being": she would feel less of a human being, or not able to respect herself, if she did not participate. Her self-respect, her dignity, is involved.
An account of the microfoundations of ethnic or national resistance thus requires sensitivity to historically inherited attitudes and power relations among many groups, if not all. By starting with individuals and not the cultural or historical inheritances and power relations within which individuals may be embedded, a typical rational-choice account misses much of what motivates ethnic or nationalist behavior. In the process, it is unable to account for some of the most important and persistent phenomena noted by students of ethnicity. Why, for example, do the minorities typically feel the group identity much more strongly than do the dominant groups? People, whether from the dominant or the subordinate group, are mere individuals in a purely instrumental framework. When Isaiah Berlin said that Jews tend to "have longer memories," that "they are aware of a longer continuity as a community than any other which has survived," and "geography" is what they historically lacked,60 he was making a statement about his community that was incomprehensible in purely instrumental terms. Why keep memories? Why should geography matter? Why not change identity, instead of finding geography to match history? Structured patterns of dominance and subordination and a history of suffering have customarily shaped answers to these questions, not pure instrumental rationality.
Value Rationality and Ethnic Mobilization
The explanation above explores only the microfoundations of ethnic resistance. It does not account for ethnic mobilization. How are the microfoundations and ethnic mobilization related? Three mechanisms can be specified.
First, a critical mass of individuals having a strong group identification is all that one needs to explain the origins of ethnic mobilization; strong identification of all with the group is not necessary. Value-rational microfoundations thus overcome the principal difficulty faced by a purely instrumental explanation, which was unable to explain the origins of ethnic mobilization.
Second, depending on how the dominant groups and the state respond to the critical mass, mobilization itself can be identityforming for those who did not initially participate in it. Hegemony may give way to an assertion of self-respect. In 1919, when thousands of Indians (in defiance of a prohibition on political meetings) organized a protest meeting in Amritsar, India, and a British general ordered a massacre to implement the law, a turning point was reached in India's national movement.61 The massacre changed Gandhi, convincing him that India's self-respect was not possible until the British left; it changed Nehru from a man who was "more British than the British" to one "homespun" and capable of making the transition from a life of privilege and luxury to one of personal sacrifice for the sake of a nation. Indeed, so many Indians experienced the self-awareness of dignity that after the Amritsar massacre it became possible to launch a nationwide civil-disobedience movement.
Similarly, the American civil-rights movement in the 1960s formed the assertive identity of a large number of African Americans: "While the students in their neat suits and demure dresses sat-in, marched, demonstrated, sang and prayed, the police, the sheriff's deputies and the Klan responded to nonviolence with violence, meeting the doves of peace with the police dogs of war."62 Elsewhere, barely a few years after the formation of Pakistan, the East Pakistanis realized that their linguistic identity was at stake in a nation they joined for religious reasons. They were told that Urdu, the language of Muslim migrants from India, would be the language of the new nation, even though East Pakistanis, constituting a majority of the country, spoke Bengali. A cultural cleavage within the new nation was thus born, giving room to politics and mobilization based on a linguistic identity. As this politics unfolded, the identity of the silent bystanders was also formed.
Third, as is implicit above, a conflict cannot take place unless we also factor in the behavior of the dominant groups. The dominant groups typically have three options: defend preexisting privileges, with no adjustments made; incorporate the elite of the disadvantaged groups in the power structure; or renegotiate privilege, accepting some notion of fairness. To defend preexisting privileges is a case of prejudice; to incorporate the elite, one of selective cooptation; to renegotiate privilege, one of fairness. In no case, including the last, is conflict ruled out.
A defense of privilege or prejudice clearly spells trouble, once the ideological hegemony of group hierarchy is broken and a middle class capable of organizing the group develops among the previously disadvantaged. Examples are legion. Depending on the nature of the political system, such conflict may be relatively peaceful or violent. If the political system allows the freedom to organize, ethnic mobilization may dominate democratic politics but conflict may also be politically resolved and violence overcome. However, if the political system is repressive, ethnic conflict may remain hidden or may not emerge in a routine way (erupting violently, for instance, when the state is weak).
Selective cooptation may work if the elites so incorporated continue to hold sway over the masses and are not outbid by alternative leaders refusing to be co-opted. It may defuse ethnic conflict or even resolve it through what Arend Lijphart calls a consociational system.63 Outbidding, however, is not uncommon in ethnic conflicts. Consociationalism works under well-specified institutional conditions.64
Most interestingly, however, conflict can occur even when the leaders of the dominant group renegotiate privilege. The problem simply is that the question of what constitutes fairness has no uniquely acceptable answer. Why should the members of this generation pay for the inequities of the past, in which they did not directly participate? How much should they pay, if they must? For how long? Multiple answers exist; the outcomes are politically determined. On affirmative action, such struggles are universal.
Three Kinds of Ethnic and Nationalistic Behavior
Central to the alternative account I have presented above are notions of hierarchy, dignity, and recognition. Goal-oriented thinking exists in this alternative account, but it is defined with respect to the values so specified, not independently of these values. This conception of strategic behavior is different from the one in which ethnicity itself is seen as a means to an end. If we combine the two notions of rationality discussed above, we get three different kinds of ethnic and nationalistic behavior, which we should distinguish from one another.
The pure case of value rationality Martyrdom-suicide bombing, in these times-is the pure form of value-rational behavior. In such cases, no cost (including death) is considered too high by an ethnic partisan. If aimed at enhancing group prospects, to kill may be a form of instrumental behavior-and likewise, being killed may result from someone else behaving instrumentally. But to die is not instrumentally rational for an individual, for whatever its benefits to the group, the martyr will not be there to see his dreams fulfilled. Such martyrdom, however, can be instrumentally beneficial for the group, for it can touch off strong emotions, raising the level of group consciousness. Indeed, collective martyrdom or martyrdom of an important leader of the group can be a tipping point in group consciousness and mobilization.65
It is possible to argue that religious martyrdom is, in fact, Alternatively, people may try to change the form of protest. Sometimes, this means moving from nonviolent to violent means; at other times, it simply entails exploring alternative nonviolent strategies, as seen in the Indian freedom movement, of which the Salt March was a component, and in the American civil-rights movement. In many nationalist conflicts, however, even when the ends are noble, the means are not. Violence is often used as an instrument for ethnic ends. Our moral objections to violence notwithstanding, it is undeniable that from the perspective of ethnic and national partisans, violence can represent a combination of value rationality and instrumental rationality.
When asked by psychologist Sudhir Kakar why they killed members of the other community, the wrestlers involved in communal violence in the Indian city of Hyderabad argued that they were defending the quam (nation). They stopped killing, they said, when they had killed more than the wrestlers of the other community had killed. Indeed, after giving them tests to check lies, falsehood, and dissimulation, Kakar had to conclude-much to his emotional dismay but true to his professional craft-that in psychological terms, the killers were "warriors," not "murderers."67 Much of the dynamics and intensity of ethnic conflict cannot be explained unless we understand how decisions are made about which sections of the population-women, children, and old people or the able-bodied men-are the targets of violence; whether festivals and celebrations are disrupted; whether sacralized monuments and places of worship are attacked; whether automatic weapons are used by a few or small weapons by a lot, although each method may kill as many people. We are in a world Table 1 summarizes the argument so far. The pure case of value rationality may account for the origins of ethnic mobilization but not for its sustenance; the pure case of instrumental rationality cannot explain why ethnic mobilization commences, although it may begin to explain behavior once mobilization has reached a critical point; and the combination of value and instrumental rationality can explain both why ethnic mobilization begins and how it is sustained.
Conclusions: Pluralizing Microfoundations
Three conclusions follow. First, rational-choice theories are unable to answer some of the fundamental questions in the study of ethnicity and nationalism. They almost wholly concentrate on why leaders manipulate ethnicity or national feelings, ignoring questions without which we can't understand mobilization for ethnic or national resistance: Why do the masses join ethnic and national movements when the costs of participation are almost certain to be high? And why do minorities so often feel the group identity more intensely than do majorities? To answer these questions, one has to pluralize the concept of rationality. A distinction between value rationality and instrumental rationality, as proposed by Weber, will be a good starting point. The former concept is considerably less sensitive to the notion of costs of behavior than the latter. Some goals-national liberation, racial equality, ethnic self-respect-may be deemed so precious that high costs, quite common in movements of resistance, are not sufficient to deter a dogged pursuit of such objectives. The goals are often not up for negotiation and barter; the means deployed to realize them may well be.
However-and this is the second conclusion-once ethnic preferences are in place and mobilization has reached a critical mass, raising prospects of success, one can use the rational-choice methods to understand why many people join ethnic or national movements. 
